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Abstract—Cryptocurrencies have become very popular in re-
cent years. Thousands of new cryptocurrencies have emerged,
proposing new and novel techniques that improve on Bitcoin’s
core innovation of the blockchain data structure and consensus
mechanism. However, cryptocurrencies are a major target for
cyber-attacks, as they can be sold on exchanges anonymously and
most cryptocurrencies have their codebases publicly available.
One particular issue is the prevalence of code clones in cryptocur-
rencies, which may amplify security threats. If a vulnerability is
found in one cryptocurrency, it might be propagated into other
cloned cryptocurrencies. In this work, we propose a systematic
remedy to this problem, and we propose COINWATCH (CW).
Given a reported vulnerability at the input, CW uses the code
evolution analysis and a clone detection technique for indication
of cryptocurrencies that might be vulnerable. We applied CW
on 1094 cryptocurrencies using 4 CVEs and obtained 786 true
vulnerabilities present in 384 projects, which were confirmed with
developers and successfully reported as CVE extensions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is designed to be a peer-to-peer electronic cash
system, introducing an innovative consensus mechanism and
incentives for participants. All participants in the consensus
protocol must run a full node. Bitcoin has inspired hundreds
of cryptocurrencies utilising blockchain technology to serve
as a decentralised means of transferring crypto-assets. There
were 98 cryptocurrencies introduced in 2016, 412 introduced
in 2017, and 726 introduced in 2018. Given that Bitcoin’s
codebase [1] is publicly available, developers may easily fork
its repository from GitHub and make custom modifications,
which they might later publish as their own cryptocurrency.
In this way, many cryptocurrencies might become popular and
adopted by the public. However, many cryptocurrencies are
also “popular” due to various high profile security incidents [2],
[3], [4], [5].
Detecting and patching the vulnerabilities manually is pro-
hibitively costly. Due to the decentralised nature of cryptocur-
rencies, whenever a patch is created, individual miners have to
patch their own nodes independently. In the case of the inflation
bug in Bitcoin, the vulnerability was fixed by only 31.65% of
Figure 1: A histogram of forked projects from Bitcoin and their clone
ratios as compared to Bitcoin v0.17.0.
all nodes [6] even after a full year from the disclosure.1 The in-
flation bug [7] was discovered in September 2018 and allowed
the inflation of the total Bitcoin supply. Upon analysis, it was
found that this vulnerability had been present since 2017 but
has been patched only recently. Nevertheless, this vulnerability
is shared by 31 cryptocurrencies that emerged as modifications
of Bitcoin clones. Clearly, patching the vulnerability across
all such cryptocurrencies is of paramount importance for their
financial stability.
Our empirical study shows that 786 cryptocurrencies were
directly or indirectly forked from a version of Bitcoin. Figure 1
depicts the histogram of code similarity (i.e., clone ratio) of
cryptocurrencies against the Bitcoin code base. In most of the
cases, the clone ratio is below 30%; however, some of them
have this ratio even higher than 50%. Therefore, once a vulner-
ability is discovered in one cryptocurrency, the vulnerability is
very likely to be propagated among its clones. Editing cloned
code bases is a common phenomenon in software engineering
and maintenance. Nevertheless, the popularity of forking code
bases of cryptocurrencies makes the problem unique in that:
1As of 17th September 2019, the ratio of updated nodes is equal to 31.65%.
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(1) the clones are spread across vast number of projects,
which makes overall clone management difficult, (2) the code
among cryptocurrency projects is of high similarity, and (3)
the financial impact of neglecting a propagated vulnerability
might be extremely costly.
In this work, we propose COINWATCH (CW), a clone-
based approach that indicates propagated vulnerabilities across
cryptocurrencies. At the input, CW takes the code fragment
relevant to a known vulnerability in a target cryptocurrency and
the code repositories of monitored cryptocurrencies. First, CW
analyzes when the vulnerability of the target cryptocurrency
was introduced within its incremental code history (e.g., Git).
Next, CW goes through the suspicious cryptocurrencies and
infers whether they were forked before the vulnerability was
introduced. In the positive case, CW conducts clone detection
to find out whether the given vulnerability has been already
fixed and if not it reports a warning.
We have built a proof-of-concept tool for CW , which to
the date scans 1094 cryptocurrencies and compares them to
Bitcoin, serving as the target cryptocurrency. For evaluation
purposes, we selected the top four cryptocurrency-oriented
CVEs in terms of severity. In sum, CW reported 786 prop-
agated vulnerabilities across 384 cryptocurrencies, achieving
true positive rate of 89.7%. We notified the developers of
affected cryptocurrencies and reported vulnerabilities found to
NVD NIST. In turn, we obtained 4 CVE extensions: CVE-
2018-17144, CVE-2016-10724, CVE-2016-10725, and CVE-
2019-7167, which are described at https://github.com/JinBean/
CVE-Extension/.
II. AN ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate how CW works while taking
CVE-2018-17144 as an example.
A. CVE-2018-17144 Explained
This vulnerability is a result of reachable assertion weakness
CWE-617 [8], and it enables crashing of any node in the
network by crafting a transaction that double spends (see
Figure 2), which causes a DoS of all nodes that receive a mined
block containing such a transaction. The vulnerability was
fixed in Bitcoin release 0.16.3 on Sep 18, 2018. We depict the
Figure 2: Propagated code of DoS vulnerability (CVE-2018-17144).
Cryptocurrency Timeframe (MM/DD) Months Vulnerable
Argentum 12/16-11/18 23
Chaincoin 12/16-10/18 22
CreativeCoin 12/16-11/18 23
DigiByte 12/16-9/18 21
EliCoin 2/18-11/18 9
Irlecoin 6/18-present not fixed
Litecoin 12/16-9/18 21
Lynx 12/6-10/18 22
Machinecoin 4/17-10/18 18
MatrixCoin 12/16-10/18 22
Methuselah 4/18-10/18 6
MinexCoin 7/17-4/19 21
MktCoin 10/17-present not fixed
PlatinCoin 7/18-2/20 19
Quasarcoin 11/17-present not fixed
United Bitcoin 12/16-9/18 21
Unitus 4/17-11/18 19
Table I: Vulnerable period of CVE-2018-17144 across Bitcoin clones.
vulnerable period of this vulnerability across various Bitcoin
clones in Table I.
B. Using COINWATCH
Given the CVE description and details about a vulnerability,
the codebase of the target cryptocurrency (i.e., Bitcoin) is ana-
lyzed for the specific code segments causing the vulnerability:
1) the bug-fixing commit (b8f8019) is identified in GitHub,
2) the bug-introducing commits (eecffe5, 5083079, 3533fb4)
are identified in GitHub,
3) the first cut of potentially vulnerable cryptocurrencies is
generated based on the fork dates of input candidates.
Hence, if a cryptocurrency was created before the bug-
introducing commits in its “parent,” it is unlikely that it will
contain the bug.
In the next step of CW , the code segment that patches
the vulnerability is identified. Given this information, CW
performs a test using clone detection to check for the existence
of the vulnerable code (and the fix) within all monitored cryp-
tocurrencies. The results mark vulnerable cryptocurrencies:
they contain the code with the vulnerability but not the fix.
C. Applying CW on CVE-2018-17144
The full detection process consists of scanning the code
base of all monitored cryptocurrencies (1094) from our dataset
while searching for the code that causes the vulnerability. On
completion, CW reports a candidate set of suspicious cryp-
tocurrencies that might be vulnerable with a high likelihood.
PigeonCoin. On 26 September 2018, PigeonCoin was at-
tacked [9] due to CVE-2018-17144, resulting in a loss of
235 million PGN (i.e., $15,000 USD). The fix [10] of the
vulnerability was only uploaded to their GitHub repository on
27 September 2018: 9 days after it was added to Bitcoin. If
CW had monitored the PigeonCoin, the vulnerability would be
discovered and fixed before its exploitation.
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Figure 3: Overview of COINWATCH.
III. COINWATCH
A. Overview
The overall workflow of CW is shown in Figure 3. First,
a target CVE [11] is provided at input together with data
publicly obtainable from its structured details. After picking
a target CVE, CW performs a code evolution analysis of
the parent project to obtain bug fixing and bug introducing
commits. The bug introducing and fixing commits are then
manually annotated to minimize the code responsible for the
vulnerability and for the fix, respectively. Then, CW generates
a detection test for a clone detector. Before running the clone
detector, the list of monitored projects is filtered based on
the date of fork to narrow down the search space by pruning
unrelated and unaffected projects. Then, at the hearth of CW
is the clone detector, which, given the filtered codebases
of monitored cryptocurrencies, identifies and reports cloned
projects that are likely to be affected by the vulnerability.
B. Details
CVE Parsing. After a new vulnerability in the parent project
is reported, the CW triggers its execution. First, CW parses
the input CVE and extracts details about CVE: (1) the date
of publishing, (2) keywords from the description using a
text mining for short texts [12], (3) external links pointing
to resources of the version control system (e.g., issues, pull
requests, release notes), and (4) the list of cryptocurrencies
affected by the CVE along with the programming language
they were written in. Then, CW performs a check whether
the vulnerability is dependent on the code specific to the
Input : I: Issues that match criteria
Input : S: Regex string
Output: Gb := ∅: Git commits with bugs
Output: Gf := ∅: Git commits with fixes
1 foreach i in I do
2 foreach c in i.commits do
3 Gf := Gf ∪ RE.match(S, c)
4 end
5 end
6 foreach cf in Gf do
7 Gb := Gb ∪ getPrevCommits(cf);
8 end
9 return Gf , Gb
Algorithm 1: An extended SZZ algorithm.
cryptocurrency since some vulnerabilities may originate from
used underlying protocols (e.g., TLS). Finally, the software
release versions corresponding to the bug and the fixes are
extracted using web scrapping techniques and utilized for a
code evolution analysis that takes into account incremental
code history of a project.
Code Evolution Analysis. CW uses the code evolution of
a target project (e.g., Bitcoin) to discover the commit IDs
containing both the fix and the bug. CW sets the entry
point as the release date of the vulnerability and proceeds
back in time while iterating over the issues, until it links
the fixing commit(s) with the input CVE. To track down
the commit ID, CW utilizes the SZZ algorithm proposed
by Sliwerski, Zimmermann, and Zeller [13]. SZZ algorithm
was developed as an approach to identify bug-introducing
commits in a software repository. By leveraging on the issue-
tracking system of GitHub, we improve the accuracy using
git-blame command for finding the bug-introducing commits.
An open implementation of the SZZ algorithm called SZZ
Unleashed [14] provides insight on how to apply it in practice.
In this work, we built on SZZ algorithm and extend it for our
purpose to identify bug-fixing and bug-introducing commits.
Using regular expression matching (line 1 to 5 of Algorithm 1,
we search through all issues that have been fixed, resolved,
closed, or labeled as a ”bug”. CW uses keywords such as
”CVE”, ”CVE-ID” and extracted keywords from the CVE
details as the string pattern for regular expression matching.
This allows CW to locate the bug-fixing commits, which are
stored at Gf . To find the bug-introducing commit Gb, CW
uses git-blame functionality, which annotates the line of code
with information from the revision that modified the line as
the last one (i.e., getPrevCommits()). We emphasize that CW
Input : Vc: set of monitored projects
Input : Gb, Gf : bug-introducing and fixing commits
Output: Vvuln: set of potentially vulnerable projects
1 foreach p in Vc do
2 if p.repoForkDate ≥ minDate(Gb) ∧
p.repoForkDate ≤ maxDate(Gf ) then
3 Vvuln := Vvuln ∪ p;
4 end
5 end
6 return Vvuln
Algorithm 2: Initial filtering of monitored projects.
takes a conservative approach to pick the oldest date for the
bug-introducing commit and the newest date for the bug-
fixing commit. This method allows us to track down both
bug-introducing and bug-fixing commits, with which we are
able to estimate the time-frame of presence of the bug in any
codebase. We use this time-frame as a window representing its
propagation within a project that was created by forking the
target project.
Identification of Vulnerable Code. After obtaining bug fixing
and bug introducing commits, CW requires manual annotation
of the code in these commits (i.e., the code responsible for
the vulnerability and for the fix). This requires understanding
the cause of the vulnerability; however, this manual effort is
only a one-time action (per vulnerability), while all monitored
projects are checked automatically later. Next, CW transforms
the annotated code to a detection test suitable for a clone
detector.
Filtering of Monitored Projects. We provide a simple method
for initial filtering of monitored cryptocurrencies in Algo-
rithm 2, which is based on the timestamp of forking these
projects from the parent project. Letting Vc be the set of
monitored cryptocurrency projects, if p ∈ Vc is created after
Gb.date and before Gf .date, we consider Vc for further
analysis. Otherwise, if the repository of p was created before
the bug was introduced or after the bug was fixed, we ignore
this case since the bug had not existed at the time of forking
the project. The list of candidate projects forms our first cut
of potentially vulnerable projects. Algorithm 2 uses the output
of Algorithm 1 to identify the dates when the vulnerability
was created and presented until by checking the timestamps
associated with the particular commit IDs.
Detection Process. Finally, using the generated detection tests,
CW applies the clone detector to find clones of the parent
project in the monitored list of cryptocurrencies, which are then
analyzed using Gf and Gb to indicate such cloned projects that
are potentially vulnerable.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Experiment Setup. All the experiments we performed ran
on the machine with a quad core i7-7500U CPU clocked at
2.70GHz and equipped with 16 GB of memory. We conducted
a simulation experiment where we applied CW on the versions
of projects dating before the version where the vulnerability
was disclosed. The simulation experiment evaluated whether
some cryptocurrencies might have been fixed earlier if our
approach has been adopted. To instantiate a clone detector,
we chose Simian [15], a similarity analyzer that identifies
duplication in C++ code as well as other tools that use
text-based string comparison to identify type I clones. The
Type I clones represent the situation when code fragments
in a particular code-base are exactly the same, omitting the
comments and indentations [16], [17]. Note that Type II clones
are syntactically similar code fragments, which are usually
created from Type I clones by renaming variable names or
modifying data types. Finally, Type III clones are created due
to additions, deletions, or modifications of code fragments in
Type I or Type II clones.
Testing Simian. Before we conducted any clone detection
experiment, we first ran a test to verify that Simian is capable of
accurate detection of cloned code within the full code structure.
Therefore, we performed a positive test and compared a cloned
repository of Bitcoin-0.17 with a portion of its own code.
This identified the correct file and line numbers of the entire
code snippet. We then performed a negative test with a code
that did not exist within Bitcoin-0.17. We found that in order
to minimise false positives, we had to set the code line
threshold to the exact length of each snippet of vulnerable code.
This ensures that only cryptocurrencies containing the full
code causing the vulnerability are detected. However, doing
so increased a chance of false negatives; due to the time-
sensitive nature of cryptocurrencies and a large attack surface,
we adopted this setting since it is more important to detect true
vulnerable projects than to miss potentially vulnerable ones.
Identifying Vulnerable Code. Using the CVE database specific
to Bitcoin [18] (i.e., the parent project), we performed a review
of Bitcoin’s CVEs to select vulnerabilities that are contained in
its codebase versions in the range 〈2016, 2018〉, a time frame
where many alternative cryptocurrencies were created. Once a
CVE was selected for analysis, CW searched for the bug fixing
and bug introducing commits. Then, we manually annotated
the code segments of these commits, which are related to
the vulnerability and the fix, based on which, CW generated
detection tests for Simian. Next, CW parsed information from
the Bitcoin version where the vulnerability was introduced in
and the version it was eventually fixed at.
Clone Detection in Monitored Projects. We wrote Python
scripts that scraped coingecko.com to collect a dataset of the
names of all existing cryptocurrencies, the link of their GitHub
repositories, and the language that the cryptocurrency was
written in. Out of the 1970 cryptocurrencies that we had, 43
were listed with a broken GitHub link or were just links to
websites. We then used Git to clone all valid repositories. Since
we wanted to identify vulnerabilities from Bitcoin clones, we
removed all cryptocurrencies that had not used C++. We were
then left with 1094 cryptocurrencies. The folder structure for
the analysis comprised of one main folder, which we will call
the comparison folder. Inside the comparison folder were two
more folders; the first containing the vulnerable code and the
second containing the code of the cryptocurrency we wanted
to compare against. Python scripts were used to automate the
moving of the code from our database into the comparison
folder, running the Simian clone detection, and then moving the
code back. This was done iteratively for each cryptocurrency
in the database. Simian produced a XML file after every
iteration containing the results of the clone detection. The
XML file contains the file path of each detected clone, the
number of lines detected, and the processing time taken, as
seen in Figure 4. Another script then ran to parse each of the
Simian outputs, which gave us the list of suspicious vulnerable
cryptocurrencies. To support the validity of our methodology,
 
<simian version="2.5.10">
<check ignoreCharacterCase="true" ignoreCurlyBraces="true" ignoreIdentifierCase="true" ignoreModifiers="true" ignoreStringCase="true"
threshold="6">
<set lineCount="6" fingerprint="5eb7165c145ded7b7469ac9ac53e677b">
<block sourceFile="\simian\bin\coin\bitcoin-0.16.3\src\test\skiplist_tests.cpp" startLineNumber="24" endLineNumber="31"/>
<block sourceFile="\simian\bin\coin\Dogecoin\src\test\skiplist_tests.cpp" startLineNumber="25" endLineNumber="32"/>
</set>
<set lineCount="6" fingerprint="4ceb8650e14442de03bb7eb1b8f9b9b4">
<block sourceFile="\simian\bin\coin\bitcoin-0.16.3\src\key.cpp" startLineNumber="203" endLineNumber="211"/>
<block sourceFile="\simian\bin\coin\Dogecoin\src\key.cpp" startLineNumber="72" endLineNumber="80"/>
</set>
<set lineCount="6" fingerprint="7b80d7542d174e7bdb2e532d6a96e1bb">
<block sourceFile="\simian\bin\coin\bitcoin-0.16.3\src\test\script_tests.cpp" startLineNumber="1282" endLineNumber="1289"/>
<block sourceFile="\simian\bin\coin\Dogecoin\src\test\script_tests.cpp" startLineNumber="964" endLineNumber="971"/>
</set>
...
<summary duplicateFileCount="348" duplicateLineCount="34092" duplicateBlockCount="2369" totalFileCount="455" totalRawLineCount="160822"
totalSignificantLineCount="94838" processingTime="1624"/>
</check>
</simian>
 
Figure 4: An example of XML output from Simian.
we also experimented with Zcash (and its CVEs) serving as a
parent project (see vulnerability CVE-2019-7167).
Responsible Disclosure. Finally, before disclosing vulnerabili-
ties in the cloned projects, we filed 4 CVE extensions with
MITRE. Once the CVEs were accepted, we informed the
developers of these projects about the vulnerability and the
fix recommended in the CVE description.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluated CW through various experiments. The ex-
periments were designed to answer the following research
questions (RQs):
• RQ1: Are clones prevalent in cryptocurrencies?
• RQ2: Can we accurately detect propagated vulnerabilities
through clones?
• RQ3: Are the propagated vulnerabilities real problems?
RQ1 examines our hypothesis, i.e., clones are prevalent in
cryptocurrencies, and therefore identifying vulnerabilities by
tracking clones is an important problem. RQ2 evaluates the
accuracy of our approach. RQ3 is designed to question the
usefulness of CW in practice and reports on true positive and
false positive rates.
A. RQ1: Clone Prevalence
To answer RQ1, we systematically applied CW to the latest
versions of the cryptocurrencies within our dataset scraped
from coingecko as of October 2018.2 In total, there were
initially 2079 cryptocurrencies as of Oct 2018, and 4389
cryptocurrencies as of Apr 2019. We note that a large number
of new cryptocurrencies were created in this short period of
time. There are also different types of cryptocurrencies; e.g,
2431 of them are ERC-20 tokens [19], which we consider as
out-of-scope.3 Out of the remaining 2079 cryptocurrencies that
2https://www.coingecko.com/en
3Note that ERC-20 tokens are built on the Ethereum platform and contain
a standardized smart contract code that is parametrized by particular tokens.
we scraped, there are 1094 cryptocurrencies that are written in
C++, the same programming language as Bitcoin is written
in. The breakdown of the remaining cryptocurrencies can be
found in Table II.
As we conjecture that these cryptocurrencies are clones
of various versions of Bitcoin, using CW , we systematically
apply Simian to compare each of these cryptocurrencies with
different versions of Bitcoin. Part of the results are summarized
in Table III, where the second column shows the overall
number of lines of code (LOC) in the project and the following
columns show the clone ratio of each cryptocurrency in respect
to different versions of Bitcoin. The clone ratio is defined as
follows:
ratioclone =
K
T
, (1)
where K is the number of LOC cloned from Bitcoin and T is
the total number of LOC. Note that Table III shows the clone
ratio of a subset of 14 cryptocurrencies that were among the
top 50 by the market capitalisation as of the time of making the
experiment. The average clone ratio was found to be 30.7%.
However, if we compare the highest clone ratio among all
versions of the same set of cryptocurrencies written in C++,
the average clone ratio increases to 46.6%. Furthermore, there
are multiple cryptocurrencies that have a clone ratio of more
Language The Number of Projects
C++ 1094
Javascript 334
C 65
Go 65
Python 36
Java 30
Others 455
Table II: Distribution of programming languages across cryptocur-
rencies considered in our work.
Cryptocurrency LOC Bitcoin 0.17.0 Bitcoin 0.16.3 Bitcoin 0.15.2 Bitcoin 0.14.2 Bitcoin 0.13.2 Bitcoin 0.12.0 Bitcoin 0.11.2
Bitcoin Cash 68545 26.0% 32.2% 34.2% 27.3% 20.3% 17.2% 13.1%
Bitcoin Diamond 51102 55.6% 70.2% 77.2% 98.1% 73.6% 56.2% 42.3%
DogeCoin 38073 33.2% 40.8% 43.9% 55.2% 67.1% 77.5% 91.6%
Monero 57232 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Zcash 51509 21.1% 24.4% 25.1% 33.8% 42.2% 46.0% 40.7%
Dash 65104 40.24% 47.23% 52.52% 63.93% 46.25% 38.62% 28.64%
DigiByte 63769 90.90% 69.32% 60.81% 42.02% 30.94% 24.14% 18.85%
Electroneum 37040 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
EOS 96066 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Litecoin 57014 76.73% 98.17% 86.11% 58.55% 43.75% 33.27% 25.83%
Nano 26987 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Qtum 112867 37.52% 48.18% 42.68% 28.82% 21.48% 16.30% 12.68%
Ravencoin 62200 63.33% 81.09% 82.41% 55.93% 41.22% 31.45% 24.27%
Steem 108561 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.07%
Table III: Percentage of cloned code as compared to various Bitcoin versions.
Vulnerability Parent Project TPR FPR
CVE-2018-17144 Bitcoin 100.0% 0.00%
CVE-2016-10724 Bitcoin 85.8% 8.4%
CVE-2016-10725 Bitcoin 85.8% 8.4%
CVE-2019-7167 Zcash 100.0% 0.00%
Table IV: A summary of the results obtained by CW .
than 90%. Hence, we conclude that code clones are indeed
prevalent in cryptocurrencies.
B. RQ2: Accuracy of COINWATCH
To answer this question, we systematically apply CW to
multiple vulnerabilities discovered in the recent years and see
whether they are propagated to other cryptocurrencies. We
focus on such vulnerabilities due to the following reasons.
First, these are high-profile vulnerabilities. Second, these vul-
nerabilities are reported between years 2016 to 2018, in which
we evinced a boom of a vast number of cryptocurrencies. A
vulnerability propagates itself across clones since it is not yet
discovered at the time when the parent project is cloned. The
propagation of a vulnerability is highly dependent on when
the source code was cloned and how long the vulnerability
has existed before it was fixed. If a cryptocurrency forked the
code during the time frame when the bug was presented in the
source code, there is a high chance of the clone containing
vulnerable code. In the result, we find out that CW is capable
of accurate detection of vulnerabilities in cloned projects as
proven by filing 4 CVE extensions.
Case Study. In the following, we focus on CVE-2018-17144.
Among 985 pre-filtered cryptocurrencies monitored using CW ,
we found that as of October 2018, 31 cryptocurrencies had
Type I clones of a vulnerable code found in Bitcoin and hence
were exposed to this vulnerability. We monitored the situation
after we alerted vulnerable projects and our CVE extension
was published at NVD. In February 2019, the results from
CW suggest that 22 of the 31 cryptocurrencies have patched
the vulnerability, while in June 2020 there were still 4 projects
unfixed. This implies that attackers had at least a month’s time
frame from the time the CVE was announced in September
2018 to attack the 31 vulnerable cryptocurrencies, exposing
up to $35, 585, 594 market capital (as of 07 October 2018).
Moreover, in February 2019 and June 2020, attackers could
still attack the remaining 9 and 4 unfixed cryptocurrencies,
respectively.
C. RQ3: Is a clone equal to a vulnerability?
To answer this question, we investigate how many of the
candidate cryptocurrencies that are discovered using CW are
indeed vulnerable. This is a challenging problem since we must
be able to determine whether the affected code is reached
or not, and whether its execution would result in the same
reported vulnerability as in the target project. Therefore, we
attempt to answer the question in two ways. First, we manually
examined all the patches of 4 CVEs (that we extended) and
applied them to reported cryptocurrencies. For each patch, we
checked if the vulnerable cloned code was modified, and if
so, whether it was modified in a way similar to the fix of the
CVE in the parent project. In the positive case, we considered
a discovery made by CW on a particular cryptocurrency as a
true vulnerability.
True Positives VS False Positives. The summary of our
results is presented in Table IV. In the case of CVE-2018-
17144, due to an extremely severe consequence of this double
spending vulnerability, many popular cloned cryptocurrencies
quickly applied the fix after the CVE was released, e.g.
Dash, Ravencoin, Bitcoin Cash, etc. This is not the case
for low-profile vulnerabilities or for smaller cryptocurrencies,
which are less diligent in keeping their code bases updated.
Pigeoncoin is an example of a cryptocurrency that suffered
from this vulnerability, and which was also exploited. We
analyzed different releases of Pigeoncoin and found that it
contained the double spending vulnerability from its official
launch on 07 April 2018 until 27 September 2018. The reason
for the bug fix on 27 September was due to an attack made on
it. If CW were to monitor Pigeoncoin at the time of the Bitcoin
patch was released, we could have identified the vulnerability
and prevented from the attack. In the case of CVE-2018-17144
and CVE-2019-7167, there were no false positives since all
Figure 5: Propagated code for DoS vulnerability in Bitcoin Diamond.
Figure 6: Propagated code for DoS vulnerability in Bitcoin Stash.
candidate cryptocurrencies reported were confirmed to really
contain these vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, CW reported a few false positives as
well. For example, although we initially found out that 422
cryptocurrencies had enabled the alert system (causing CVE-
2016-10724 and CVE-2016-10725 in the parent project), 60
cryptocurrencies reported at the output of CW did not reference
it during compilation and thus are not vulnerable. Due to this,
the true positive rate of CW was deteriorated to 85.8% for
these particular vulnerabilities.
Type II and III Clones and Possible False Negatives. Type II
and III clones come into play when the code base is edited by
changing the way certain functions work or are named. One
example of a Type III clone that we identified was presented
in Bitcoin Diamond Version 0.14.0 and 0.13.0. The code can
be seen in Figure 5. Bitcoin Diamond modified its function
CheckTransaction() to include new arguments that are specific
to Bitcoin Diamond itself. An example of Type II clone was
identified in Bitcoin Stash as seen in Figure 6, where the
CheckTransaction() function was renamed to CheckRegular-
Transaction(). These clones cannot be detected using Simian
as the clone detector, and they require more sophisticated tools
which we will consider in our future work. We contacted the
development team of these two projects regarding the possible
vulnerabilities but did not get the response; hence, we cannot
confirm whether these two cases represent false negatives.
VI. DISCUSSION
The results presented in this paper are related mainly to
Bitcoin, as it is currently the dominant cryptocurrency and has
the most number of forks from its GitHub repository. There
are other cryptocurrencies written in different programming
languages (or are close-sourced) that are similar to Bitcoin but
would not be detected as Type I clones. There is a trade-off
between false positives and false negatives if we use more
complex types of code clone detection techniques such as the
ones searching for Type II or Type III clones. In some cases
we would have to conduct a decompilation of binaries and do
the analysis on abstract syntax trees of assembly rather than
a verification of source code for match. This is the direction
that we will investigate in our future work.
A semi-automated nature of CW is another limitation, which
stems from the manual annotation of the vulnerable code
and fix within the bug fixing and bug introducing commits.
However, this is a one-time action per vulnerability and can be
performed in a relatively short time, while later CW continues
automatically in checking the full list of monitored projects. In
our future work, we plan to design simple heuristic methods
that can automate this step.
VII. RELATED WORK
Security of Cryptocurrencies. The security of cryptocur-
rencies has been undermined by several high profile incidents.
Bitcoin [20] itself has been described to be vulnerable to
several attacks [3] such as double spending [21], transaction
malleability [22], networking attacks [23] [24], and attacks
targeting mining [25] [26] [27]. As a research topic, Bitcoin’s
security is attractive due to a broad number of use cases
proposed for its underlying technology, blockchain. Bitcoin has
inspired several cryptocurrencies to build and improve different
aspects of its code to increase its transaction throughput
(eg. Bitcoin Cash) or provide greater anonymity (eg. Bitcoin
Private). The intense scrutiny of Bitcoin’s security has led to
a gap in research on the effects of vulnerabilities from Bitcoin
propagating to other cryptocurrencies that have copied parts
of Bitcoin’s code. These cryptocurrencies also store value but
are not as valuable as Bitcoin and thus do not have as many
developers and resources to build a body of research around
their security. Therefore, we developed CW to address the
security problem of propagated vulnerabilities from Bitcoin
while focusing on real-world attacks that have been identified
and fixed within Bitcoin’s code.
Clones among Cryptocurrencies. Some cryptocurrencies fork
existing repositories and launch their own cryptocurrencies
with a specific focus. As these cryptocurrencies are changing
only a portion of the forked codebase prior to launching, a
large portion of their code is cloned from the specific version
it was forked from. Prior work suggests that code clones
increase maintenance effort [28] [29], might cause bugs (Li et.
al analyzed Linux, FreeBSD, Apache [30]), and signal errors
in other parts of a codebase. It is known that clone genealogy
information can be used to identify clones that may benefit new
approaches and clone management [31]. Based on the findings
of the authors of [31], aggressive code refactoring might not
be necessary for code clones that are volatile and that the
technique of refactoring needs to be complemented by other
code maintenance approaches. CW can be considered as a code
maintenance approach applied across multiple codebases rather
than in a single codebase. Prior research analysing package
dependencies [32] utilizes a systematic approach of measuring
the attack surface exposed by individual vulnerabilities through
component level dependency analysis. In this work, cloned
cryptocurrencies do not utilize Bitcoin as a package but the
concept that the attack surface is dependent on code utilized
from elsewhere inspires CW . The authors of [33] analyzed
code diversity in the cryptocurrency projects basing on the
source code similarity. The intention of the authors was to
examine the extent to which new cryptocurrencies provide
innovations.
Code Clone Detection. Basic code clone detection tech-
niques are performed using several tools and generally follow
a 6 step process [34] to generate clone pairs. Code clone detec-
tion is mostly used for code refactoring, greater efficiency, and
code maintenance. However, this methodology has been used
for other purposes due to the large volume of open source code
that can be analyzed. The flexibility of forking open source
code means that any developer can create and deploy their
own cryptocurrency i.e., clones which may amplify previously
undetected security threats or criminal activities. A similar
environment are smart contracts in Ethereum or other smart
contract platforms. Early work focused on finding semantic
clones in smart contracts that contained vulnerabilities in the
smart contract logic is presented in [35]. A tool detecting previ-
ously discovered smart contract vulnerabilities through clones
was proposed, and can quickly identify other smart contracts
that are semantically equivalent (and thus might contain the
same set of vulnerabilities). The automatic classification of
Ponzi smart contracts based on code clones was proposed
in [36], and it bases on the fact that related smart contracts have
fundamentally similar programming logic. Clone detection was
also performed after transferring the code into an abstract
form such as strings [37], tokens [38], and abstract syntax
trees (AST) [39]. An efficient heuristic technique basing on
edit distance and AST for pair-wise comparison of smart
contract byte codes was proposed in [40]. Techniques such
as line comparison based on dot plots [41], comparing whole
files [42], pattern recognition of code characteristics through
clustering [43], finding clones within a syntactic unit through
post-processing [38], and pre-processing [44] are also used
for clone detection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed COINWATCH, an approach that
monitors a specified set of cryptocurrency projects for the
presence of vulnerabilities disclosed in their parent projects.
We applied COINWATCH on 1094 monitored cryptocurrencies
using 4 CVEs at input, and we identified 786 true vulnerable
projects, which were confirmed with developers and success-
fully reported as CVE extensions. Our results show that many
attacks could have been prevented should COINWATCH has
been monitoring the attacked projects.
In future work, we plan to extend code clone detection to
Type II and III clones to increase the detection performance
as well as eliminate a need for manual step of annotating the
code within bug fixing and introducing commits.
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